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This article describes the impact of the Italian electoral reforms of 1993 on the structure of 
political alliances. The reform, which moved Italy from a pure proportional representation 
system to a mixed largely majoritarian system, was designed to increase transparency, reduce 
corruption, limit the number of political parties, and create the conditions for a politics of 
interests, rather than a politics of influence.  Paradoxically, moving to a mixed electoral 
system had the opposite effect. In this article we demonstrate this impact, by modeling the 
structure of political alliances at multiple levels (municipal, provincial, and regional) of the 
Italian polity from 1986 to 2001, from data on roughly 441,000 persons elected to serve in 
almost 3 million positions.  
 


















| 1 | INTRODUCTION 
 
his article considers the impact of a natural experiment. The experiment was the 1993 
electoral reform of the Italian electoral system, a reform that moved Italy from a pure 
proportional representation system to a mixed first-pass-the-post, or majoritarian 
system. Drawing on data from election results for over 400,000 individuals, representing 
single parties or larger coalitions, elected to roughly 3 million positions in local, provincial, 
and regional elections from 1984 to 2001—that is from before and after the reform—we 
model the structure of political alliances over time. To anticipate the main results, we show 
that electoral rules, often largely ignored, play an enormously important role in structuring 
the political landscape.  This should not be surprising—after all, the central rationale for 
reform was that it would impact politics. However, in the Italian case, electoral reform 
designed to clarify politics, that is, designed to reduce the number of political parties and 
unravel ‘unholy’ alliances—in short, increase transparency, had the opposite impact.  
The central Italian political paradox has always been the simultaneity of rapid change and 
stability. On one hand, foreign observers of Italian politics have routinely highlighted the 
instability of the Italian political system, focusing attention on the often remarkably short life 
of the country’s governments (Partridge 1995; Cioffi-Revilla 1984). On the other hand, 
domestic observers have typically stressed the immutability of the Italian system, focusing 
attention on the fact that the Christian Democrats controlled the state for over 50 years 
without interruption—an accomplishment no other party could claim for any other 
industrialized country in the world, over this whole period (Salvadori 2001; Bufacchi 1996). 
There is truth to both accounts; if governments came and went—which they did with often-
awesome rapidity—the politicians leading them did not change, at least over the period from 
1948 to 1993. This alone suggests some support for the old adage that trees that bend with 
the wind will last longer than those that are rigid.  
Local observers are strongly split as to whether, following electoral reforms in 1993, the 
structure of the Italian political system has changed.  Not surprisingly, looking over the past 
decade or so, we observe the same debate. On one hand, some scholars argue that reform has 
transformed the political system, introducing both new rules of engagement and new 
outcomes. Here, observers stress critical changes in the alliance system, increased interest 
representation, and concomitant declines in clientalism and corruption. (Reed 2001; Gundle 
and Parker 1996) Other scholars suggest that the characteristic feature of politics in Italy—
the fact that the more things appear to change the more they stay the same—is never more 
clearly revealed than in the last decade, after electoral reform (Newell and Bull 1996; 
Ginsburg 2003; Fabbrini and Gilbert 2000, 2001 ). 
Are both sides of this debate also right? This article considers what happened in Italy after 
1993, when the structure of the Italian political system did change – driven by radical 
electoral reform that moved Italy away from a pure system of proportional representation 
and closer to a first-pass-the-post, plurality or majoritarian electoral system. The answer we 
provide is also paradoxical. Specifically, many things changed dramatically. At the same time, 
a structure for the elision of interests, for clientalism and corruption remained, albeit in a 
completely inverted form. To show this, we first describe the transformation of the Italian 
political system, showing how electoral reform induced radically new strategies for alliance 
T 
 2
formation resulting in party fragmentation, an unprecedented expansion of the number of 
political parties and a structure of often contradictory political alliances so deeply tangled, 
knotty, and cyclic as to appear as a bowl of overcooked spaghetti.  
These outcomes were unanticipated by both designers and critics of reform, all of whom felt 
– for better or for ill—that a shift away from proportional representation towards a plurality-
based system would bring to the political landscape stability, a reduction in the number of 
parties, increased transparency of rule, and a politics based on issues arising from civil society 
rather than non-ideological factional interests. Consequently, in this article we consider why 
electoral reform worked to radically transform a political system, but failed to work in the 
direction predicted by theory.  
 
Building Blocks  
Our starting point is the significant literature in political science and political sociology 
which shows that historically, electoral systems matter because electoral regimes provide 
opportunities that reward specific strategic responses on the part of parties and party 
fragments (Morelli 2004; Grofman and Lijphart 1986). Despite this general agreement on 
the importance of electoral systems for structuring politics, sociological studies of electoral 
systems and their consequences for social stability have largely faded from the landscape of 
political sociology. One idea arising from this article is that sociologists interested in political 
culture, the stability of political regimes, and the dynamics of interest-representation, may 
have much to gain by retaining close focus on the rules of political systems, for these rules 
provide the context within and through which actors strive for recognition and power.  
Although there are historical counter examples, it is generally the case that first-pass-the-post 
electoral systems—such as those in the United States (and more than 50 other countries)—
yield relatively stable two-party systems. This relationship, first identified by the French 
sociologist Duverger (1954), has been aptly termed Duverger’s law by political scientists. As 
Downs (1957) demonstrated years ago, in winner take all systems, parties have a strategic 
incentive to drift towards the center of the political landscape, since voters with positions 
elsewhere on the distribution have no rational alternative but to support the party closest to 
their interests.  
In such systems, forming new parties is difficult. In a one-dimensional system with a left-
right split, for example, new party formation on the left wing of the left-leaning party, caused 
by frustration with the platform oriented towards the center, would split the left vote, 
leading to election of the right-leaning party, a worse alternative (for those on the left) than 
the traditional left-leaning party. If it is difficult to start new parties on the left and right 
wings, it is more difficult to form parties that seek to occupy the center, for the left and right 
leaning parties will crowd as closely as possible to their position(s), thereby eliminating any 
reasonable chance that the new centrist party can achieve a plurality of votes.  
Consequently, in countries with first-pass-the-post electoral regimes, two party systems 
predominate—not because their political culture has x or y characteristic, but because the 
rational strategic response to the pay-off yields behaviors that induce two, and only two, 
parties (Sartori 1971). 
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Although there are also historical exceptions, this is not the case for countries with electoral 
systems based on proportional representation. Here one observes the obverse; incentives for 
creating new parties that can occupy distinct niches (Sartori 1972). The incentive to occupy 
niches encourages parties to drift to the extremes and in the limit case, where social cleavages 
are not cross-cutting, leads to a hollowing out of the center. As with production markets for 
commodities as diverse as disposable diapers and frozen pizza, niche seeking on the part of 
parties selling platforms leads to sustainable market-schedules composed of 5 to 7 parties (or 
firms) (Lijphart  1984).  
In countries with multiple axes around which interests are shaped, for example, left/right, 
religious/secular, north/south, etc, parties seek niches where they can garner votes sufficient 
to return candidates who then compose coalitions with other parties to make up a 
government. Since coalitions are needed to form governments, and since the center tends to 
be hollowed out as parties maneuver for identity, governments tend towards instability as the 
governing collations are composed out of alliances between parties representing increasingly 
narrow interests. Consequently, the coalitions that do form are likely to be quite 
heterogeneous, and therefore weak. This is the theory, in any case. 
Conventional wisdom then suggests that in countries moving from proportional 
representation systems to systems closer to first-pass-the-post we ought to observe a 
reduction in the number of political parties, a drift towards the center of the political 
landscape, less of an emphasis on coalition formation, and enhanced stability. There is some 
evidence from the 29 countries that have adopted mixed systems that supports these 
expectations (Shugart 2001; Jeffrey 1999). For example, the number of parties increased 
dramatically following electoral reform which moved New Zealand from a first-pass-the-post 
to a mixed majoritarian/proportional representation system in 1993 (Vowls 2000). Likewise, 
in Germany which has long had a mixed system there are two large parties (CDU and SPD) 
each with roughly 30% of the seats in the Bundestag, and three minority parties (liberal, 
socialist, and green), each with roughly 10% of the seats.  Here, then mixed systems appear 
to behave as expected. Specifically, in proportional representation tiers, we observe 
fractionalization of the party system, and in majoritarian tiers, we observe consolidation 
through election alliances (Cox 1997; Ferrara 2004; Moser 1997, 1999; Riker 1962). There 
is also evidence that mixed systems may lead to mixed results (Cox and Schoppa 2002). For 
example, Kostadinova (2002) suggests that mixed systems may stimulate moderate party 
fragmentation in Eastern Europe. Likewise, Ferrara and Herron (2005) show for 14 mixed 
systems evidence for contamination effects where the strategic incentive to parties encourages 
them to “go it alone” and reject pre-election cooperative agreements. Where contamination 
effects are observed, therefore, outcomes are more variable. In the Italian case, for example, 
Ferrara (2004) suggests that coordination (at the national level) reflects incentives that arise 
from the “majoritarian character of its electoral system” (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Donovan 
2002).  
In Italy, reform in 1993 shifted the electoral system away from a strict proportional 
representation (hereafter PR) system towards a majoritarian, first-past-the-post system 
(hereafter, FPTP). But as we noted earlier, in contrast to expectations from received theory, 
local, provincial, and regional Italian politics after reform features an explosion in the 
number of parties, an increased emphasis on coalition formation, and a structure conducive 
to a politics of influences rather than a politics of interests.  
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In this article we demonstrate these empirical outcomes. They have not been identified 
previously. To do so, we draw on data on the party affiliations of roughly 3 million elected 
officials holding office in more than 400,000 positions at multiple levels of observation, from 
the smallest towns to the largest regions in Italy over a twenty-year period (both before and 
after electoral reform).  
The organization for what follows is straightforward. We first describe the electoral systems 
(pre and post reform). We then discuss the data and methods. We then show data that 
indicate an explosion of parties, and coalitions, and what we believe are quite striking 
network images that reveal massive structural change across all levels subsequent to electoral 
reform. Finally we suggest why these outcomes—a true tragedy of the commons—although 
unanticipated, arose. 
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| 2 | THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
 
ust as the United States has multiple levels of elected bodies – federal, state, county, etc; 
the Italians also have multiple levels. Here we concentrate only on the three levels below 
the national level, the region (by analogy to the US, state), the province (there is no exact 
analogy in the US context) and the commune (by analogy the municipality or county). In 
contrast to the United States where local, state, and national elections are governed by the 
exact same electoral rule (FPTP), the Italian electoral system subsequent to electoral reform 
in 1993 consists of multiple electoral regimes, each quite complicated. Here we describe the 
gross morphology of the pre-reform and post-reform communal, provincial, and regional 
regimes. Although we note differences across these systems, and while these differences have 
been the focus of Italian academics (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1995; Chiaramonte and 
D’Alimonte 2000) it is critical to remember that the systems are, at their core, deeply similar. 
The similarity they share is that all are based on mixed logics, part FPTP and part 
proportional.   
 
Pre-Reform Rules in Italy 
The simplest system is the PR pre-reform system, which assigned seats of the council (or 
legislative body) to parties on a proportional base using the d’Hondt method common to 
many European countries and (in modified form) the EU Parliament. This allocation system 
works by calculating successive quotients for each list, where the formula for the quotient is 
V/(s+1), where V is the total number of votes that list received, and s is the number of seats 
that party has been allocated (initially 0 for all parties).  
Whichever list has the highest quotient gets the next seat allocated, and their quotient is 
recalculated given their new seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been 
allocated. The idea is to allocate seats in proportion to the number of votes a list received. 
This is achieved by maintaining the ratio of votes received to seats allocated as closely as is 
possible. As an aside, we note that in all PR systems, there is a slight bias that benefits larger 
parties, and this is also the case for the d’Hondt approach. In the Italian case, this bias was 
not particularly significant. Prior to electoral reform, mayors of the municipalities, and 
presidents of the provinces and regions were elected by the relevant councils, which were 
composed following the d’Hondt system, and not directly by the people. Consequently, one 
of the elements behind the “sale” of reform was more direct election. In the pre-reform 




In contrast to the simplicity of the pre-reform system, post-reform electoral systems in Italy 
appear positively Byzantine; each characterized by a labyrinth of rules and conditions for 
their application. Politicians understand the systems; but ordinary Italians likely have only a 
grasp of the bare outlines and even those relatively sophisticated in politics have only partial 
understanding (Fabbrini 2000).  All of the systems at each level mix, with varying degree, 
proportional and majoritarian components. This is the central and most important fact, even 
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though the specific mix—that is, what proportion of seats under what conditions are 
allocated proportionally—differs across each level, with the regional most distinct from the 
provincial and communal.  
 
Communal and Provincial Systems 
We start with the local level—the commune—for the fifteen ordinary regions as established 
by the electoral reforms of 1993. There are five “irregular” regions that have relative 
autonomy over education, public health, environment, and so on. These regions also vary 
with respect to some details of the electoral system. In the autonomous regions, the 
proportion of local council seats allocated through the FPTP system differs slightly, but for 
what happens here we can ignore this.  The simplest case is for the 7455 (roughly 92%) 
municipalities with fewer than 15,000 residents. In these small towns, election of the mayor 
and council occur on the same day. The candidate for mayor who receives the most votes is 
elected (this is a FPTP system, familiar to those in the United States) and his/her party, 
receives two-thirds of the council seats. The number of council seats and the size of the 
giunta (the executive branch) for each commune are largely determined by the population 
size, so the relevant variable is the proportion of seats assigned to the leading party or 
coalition.  The remaining seats are assigned on the basis of proportional representation using 
the d'Hondt method. Just as a mayor’s party gets 2/3rds of all the seats, if a mayor supported 
by a coalition wins the election, parties within the coalition are assigned seats to the council 
following the d’Hondt method, with parties getting more votes rewarded accordingly. 
Life becomes more complex with the larger commune. For frame of reference, the large 
communes are extremely important in the Italian political context, including for example, 
Rome, Milan, Bologna, and Naples. Contestation in these major urban areas for political 
power is intense—and given the decentralized nature of the political system as a whole, more 
salient than comparable American positions, perhaps with the exception of the Mayoralties 
of New York, Boston, Los Angeles, etc. For municipalities with more than 15,000 residents, 
the Mayor is elected if s/he receives in the first round an absolute majority of all votes cast. In 
this regard, the system is comparable to the American system. If no candidate—as is the 
norm—gets an absolute majority, the top two candidates compete in a run-off election. The 
winner of the run-off is elected as Mayor. We are familiar with this for the democratic 
primaries, for example.  In this regard, the system also reduces to a FPTP system. 
If the Mayor is elected on the first round and if his or her coalition (or party) received more 
than 50% but fewer than 60% of the votes for council seats, the coalition is allocated 60% of 
the seats on the council. Second, the Mayor’s coalition is allocated 60% of the council seats if 
the mayor is elected in the run-off and no other coalition received more than 40% of the 
vote in the first round. The fact that the Mayor’s coalition is allocated 60% of the seats 
under both scenarios even though they do not receive 60% of the vote is designed to induce 
stability and enable a party or a coalition to actually govern. For all instances in which there 
was a run-off and for the remaining 40% of the council seats if there was not a run-off, 
council seats are allocated using the d’Hondt system. As for the smaller municipalities, 
within the winning coalitions, seats are assigned using the d’Hondt method. 
The electoral system for the Provincial President and Provincial Council is similar to the 
large municipalities. The only difference is that the winning party or coalition is assured 60% 
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of the seats in the council, independent of minority coalition strength. Specifically, if the 
winning coalition does not receive 60% of the vote, they are allocated 60% of the seats on 
the Council; the balance then allocated using the d’Hondt method.  
 
Regional regimes 
The regional system is extremely complex, mixing multiple lists and levels with so many 
possibilities that it would be difficult to exhaustively list them The main element is that 80% 
of the seats on the regional council are allocated by the d’Hondt system, the balance 
allocated on the basis of absolute vote (e.g., a majoritarian system). Each region is composed 
of multiple provinces. The lists for seats under the proportional regime are organized on a 
provincial basis while the lists for seats under the majoritarian regime are based on the whole 
region. The vote for both groups of lists is cast at once on the same day.  The two groups of 
lists must be tied. Specifically, each provincial list must be tied to a regional list, and the 
regional list must be tied with lists in at least half of the provinces. To be eligible for 
inclusion in the proportional component, a party (or coalition) must receive either 3% of the 
votes in a specific province, or 5% of the overall regional vote.  
Voters are presented with two lists, one for the province and one for the region. They tend to 
vote inconsistently across these lists, for example, voting for party or alliance X in the 
proportional provincial election, while for the majoritarian component voting for party or 
alliance Y (D'Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). This inconsistency may either be the result of 
confusion, or reflect strategy, where voters distinguish between chances of programs under 
different electoral regimes and shift their votes accordingly.  
As with the municipalities and provinces, there are two allocation systems—a PR system for 
80% of the seats and a majoritarian system for the remaining 20%. The seats assigned 
through PR strictly follow the d’Hondt system; however the remaining “majoritarian” seats 
(20%) are allocated differently, depending on the outcome of the proportional component. 
Specifically, if the provincial lists that are tied to the winning regional list already have 50% 
of seats on the council, the winning regional list is allocated only 50% of all the majoritarian 
seats, i.e., 10%. This limits the ruling coalition to 60% of the seats. The remaining seats are 
assigned to candidates from the losing coalitions following d’Hondt. If the provincial lists 
that are tied to the winning regional list have fewer than 50% of all the votes, and the 
regional list that wins the regional vote wins with fewer than 40%, then the winning regional 
list is allocated all of the available seats, e.g. the remaining 20%. This brings the leading 
party to 60% of the provincial parliamentary seats. Thus, when a party or coalition receives 
fewer votes at the regional level, they are allocated more seats. 
If the winning lists (the linked provincial and regional lists) after this allocation do not 
compose at least 55% of the council seat, the number of seats in the council is increased and 
seats are assigned to the winning coalition so that the winning list will have 55%. The 
council thus expands and contracts like an accordion to ensure that the winning coalition has 
between 55% and 60% of the vote. This process—of rewarding losing to a point—
encourages party fragmentation and re-alliance. As with the Mayors of the larger 
municipalities, regional governors are elected if they win an absolute majority of votes. If no 
candidate wins an absolute majority, the leading candidates participate in a run-off election. 
The winner of that election is appointed to the governorship. 
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In short, the post-reform electoral system is, across each level, an awkward mix of competing 
PR and majoritarian principles. While different, each system rewards parties for forming 
coalitions that achieve very narrow majorities.  These narrow majorities are then amplified 
under the seat allocation systems in place to guarantee stability of rule. From the point of 
view of each party, considering whether to join or leave a coalition, they get the most 
benefits when their party is small and when the coalition victory is fragile. These micro-
incentives express themselves with respect to their strategic behavior. First, however, we 
describe the data used for this article, and the methods we employ to reveal structure over 
time. 
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| 3 | DATA AND METHODS 
 
e use data compiled by the Italian interior ministry that identifies all of the 
individuals ever elected to public office in Italy from 1984 to 2001 at the 
municipal (commune), provincial and regional levels. Italy is divided into 20 
regions, 5 of which have special legislative powers (Valle D’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia and Sicily). Each region is composed of provinces and each 
province is composed of numerous municipalities. At the time of data analysis, there were 
103 provinces in Italy and 8101 municipalities.   
  
Table 1: Number of positions and individuals at each level  
 
 Regions Provinces Municipalities 
Years Individuals Positions Individuals Positions Individuals Positions 
1988 1027 1245 2836 3618 147431 194443 
1989 1052 1283 2985 3712 149952 197045 
1990 1050 1281 3021 3757 147791 194311 
1991 1058 1258 2935 3636 144478 189805 
1992 1056 1242 2924 3546 141045 179680 
1993 1054 1258 2992 3505 135367 169425 
1994 1083 1292 3628(*) 3652 126768 144710 
1995 1095 1308 3685 3709 132329 150017 
1996 1095 1309 3696 3724 132290 149423 
1997 1091 1290 3575 3590 132602 149638 
1998 1091 1304 3592 3623 130703 148302 
1999 1138 1277 3643 3677 130143 148476 
2000 1144 1279 3681 3712 130448 149701 
2001 1147 1281 3642 3679 128652 148359 
Total 17734 20731 53563 59271 2368799 2909178 
Unique 
Individuals 




Table 1 reports the number of positions and individuals by year for each level. Ignoring 
minor variation in the number of positions each year, there are slightly more than 1000 
positions at the regional level, 3500 at the provincial level, and 130,000 at the local 
(municipal) level. In total, we have data on the incumbents of roughly 3 million positions. In 
the last column, we report the number of unique individuals elected at each level; 3,266 at 
the regional level, 12,034 at the provincial level, and 441,000 at the local level.  From 1984-
1987, the regional level data are missing observations from the South – consequently, we do 
not consider these data in our analyses. The sharp increase in the number of provincial 
positions in 1994 is caused by the addition of 8 new provinces.  
As implied earlier, at each level the public administration is composed of a legislative council 
and an executive (giunta).  Occupying multiple positions across levels is not uncommon. The 
same person can be, at the same time, a member of the town council and a member of the 
provincial council and in small commune one can be member of the council and of the 
giunta. Multiple individuals holding more than one office across levels and within the local 
level partly accounts for the variation in the number of positions between years for the three 
series.  
Since electoral reform, an increasing number of politicians have been elected as part of local 
political groups, known as civic lists. The name of civic list stems from the alleged origin of 
the candidates—civil society rather than the political parties. The civic list appears to be a 
strategy for individuals associated with small parties to achieve sufficient votes to qualify for 
the proportional component of the seat allocation system. Consequently, politicians from 
small peripheral parties are roughly 8 to 12 times more likely to appear on civic lists than 
politicians from larger parties with stable histories, without any further distinction.  Not 
surprisingly, civic lists appear to predominate in small municipalities, these with fewer than 
15,000 inhabitants. In 2001, for example, no individuals were identified as elected from a 
Lista Civica from Milan, Florence, or Bari, and only six individuals were elected from Lista 
Civica in Rome. Figure 1 reports the distribution of Lista Civica politicians by level over 
time. 









































































By 2001, at the municipal level, more than 50% of the seats went to candidates running on a 
Lista Civica in very small communes, while roughly 20% of the seats are filled from persons 
elected on Lista Civica in large municipality and provincial elections. Over the whole period, 
fewer than 10% of the individuals who ever served at the regional level are elected on a Lista 
Civica. Those at the municipal level who are elected on civic lists (Lista Civica and local 
parties) have significantly different career outcomes than those who are elected as 
representatives of parties. Specifically, they are significantly (p=.01) less likely to experience 
mobility to either the regional or provincial level than those elected from within the party 
system. Local politics and politicians with localist orientations dominate the civic lists. 
Consequently, their impact on the macro-structure of the political system, as described in 
this article, is limited. 
For each elected individual, we have a record of the political party(ies) under whose label the 
candidate was elected. If individuals ran under multiple parties, they provide a link between 
the parties that they jointly represent. Thus, a candidate running for office under the joint 
auspices of the Alleanza Nazionale and Forza Italia induces a tie between these two parties. 
Technically, we build bipartite graphs of parties and politicians for each year and level. A 
simple example of such a graph is reported in Figure 2 (panels a and b) for the case in which 
a candidate “A” is elected under an alliance of three parties: Partito Democratico della Sinistra 
(PDS), Partito Popolare (PPI) and Rifondazione Comunista (RC), and a second candidate “B” 
is elected under an alliance of PPI and Lista Dini (LD), as shown in Panel a.  This bipartite 
graph, by ordinary matrix multiplication (Breiger 1974; Bearman and Everett 1993), gives 
rise to a party-to-party graph, as shown in Panel b.  Subsequent analyses focus on the 
structure of the party-to-party graphs, for all parties, across all levels, for all years from 1984 
to 2001. 
 






























Because a party alliance means that elected individuals jointly represent the parties, the edges 
linking parties are composed of individuals, giving rise to a party-to-party matrix that 
provides the basis for our analysis of the structure of political alliances. To eliminate the 
possibility that edges between two parties are the result of trivial alliances, we consider only 
parties that are strongly connected by multiple alliances.  To establish a threshold for 
indicating the presence of a tie between two parties, we generate an ordered vector by 
number of ties between parties for each level and election, for those parties with alliances. 
We set the bottom 3% of all observations to zero, indicating an absence of ties. In practice, 
this means that an edge between parties on the graphs of the structure of alliance at the 
municipalities level indicate at least 20 or more instances in which the parties were 
connected. For the provincial and regional level, ties are not indexed unless there are at least 
more than 15 instances of alliance. Consequently, idiosyncratic alliances, or alliances that 
result from data entry error, are not included and only alliances that are repeatedly observed 
are analyzed. The ties that make up the links between parties formed by a pre-election 
coalition are thus not artifacts of our design. They must appear dozens of times for us to 




| 4 | RESULTS 
 
e first turn to description of data that reveal the basic demography of the system, 
with respect to parties and coalitions, for the pre and post electoral reform 
periods. These data are reported in Figure 3.  
 




Figure 3 reports the number of active parties in the system. It is easy to observe a 
phenomenal increase in the number of parties at the local level, an increase that anticipates 
the electoral reforms of 1993. This anticipation is due in part to the major corruption 
scandals and resulting trials that rocked the political system in the late 1980s, ultimately 
resulting in the breakdown of the centrist governing coalition built by the DC. At the local 
level, the ex-DC (at least those not imprisoned) formed their own parties, to avoid taint of 
association. The increase in the number of parties at all of the levels is still striking, even if 
the curve is not as sharp for the regional as the municipality level.  But even at the regional 
level we observe roughly 50 identifiable parties (competing for a minimum of 3% of the 
vote).  Across all levels, electoral reform designed to reduce the number of political parties 
had the reverse effect.  
We now turn to consider the proportion of candidates elected as members of a coalition over 
time. The 1984-87 data are sparse as noted earlier, but there is no obvious reason why this 
should artificially reduce the proportion of persons elected as a member of a coalition, so we 
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include them here.  For each region Figure 4 reports the proportion of candidates elected on 
a coalition ticket. Prior to reform in 1993, roughly 5% of candidates for regional 
parliamentary positions, and fewer than 30% of candidates for municipal or provincial 
positions ran as members of a coalition. Following the clean hands corruption trials of the 
early 1990s, the breakdown of the DC, and the consequent fragmentation of the communist 
party, and in anticipation of electoral reforms of 1993 we observe a striking increase in the 
proportion of candidates running as members of a coalition. By 1997, just a few years after 
reform, almost every candidate at every level represents a coalition of parties. Visual 
inspection of Figure 4 reveals this dramatic change: coalitions replace parties as the principle 
organizing element of the political sphere. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of officials elected in coalitions 
 
This shift—from party to coalition—should be expected as a consequence of moving from 
PR to a FPTP system as parties move to occupy the center of the electoral space. In theory, 
in order to capture the center under a FPTP system, coalitions will form internally prior to 
each election, rather than externally after the fact. In some regards, this is what we observe. 
In theory, coalitions formed ex ante (as versus ex post) move towards the “median voter”, 
while retaining characteristics—as left, or right; secularor lay, etc.—to not alienate traditional 
support. 
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The fact of coalitions however does not really tell us anything about their structure, or the 
structure of ideological differences that are refracted and organized by political parties. The 
next three figures, one each for the municipalities, provincial and regional levels, address this 
issue.  Figures 5, 6 and 7 report the structure of the pre-election alliances for each level from 
1988 to 2001.  We exclude 1984 to 1987 because there are no pre-election alliances, and 
there is therefore nothing to be gained by representing a longer series of empty graphs.   
 









  1993 - 1996
 1997 - 1999
  2000 - 2001
  1988 - 1992 
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Focusing first on the local municipal level, each dot represents a party. Thus, in 1989, there 
are 50 dots. Lines connecting dots reflect alliances between parties. In 1989, for example, we 
observe 11 alliances between 13 parties in three small, disjoint, components. By 1994 we 
observe almost 100 unique parties at the municipal level—rising to 137 in 2000. Figure 5 
thus reports trimmed alliance structures from 1994 onward. Specifically, we exclude from 
representation (but not analysis) isolates and parties that have alliances with only one other 
party, composing a disjoint dyad. Figures 6 and 7, which report the structure of alliances 
between parties at the provincial and regional levels respectively, are not trimmed.  
Considering Figure 5 first, the fourteen panels report the structure of alliances over time 
reading down, from left to right.  Thus the first panel in the top left refers to 1988, the panel 
immediately below to 1989. The second column starts with 1993, the year of electoral 
reform. From 1988 to 1993 we observe very few alliances connecting a minority of parties in 
small disjoint components.  Subsequent to electoral reform in 1993 we observe massive 
structural change, resulting in the emergence of a single interconnected component that links 
the majority of parties into what appears to be a giant bowl of spaghetti. By 1995, this 
structure—an inversion of the pattern observed under DC control in the pure proportional 
representation period—is in firmly in place. Instead of a hollow center surrounded by small 
isolated peripheral parties in perpetual opposition, we observe a crowded center of 
overlapping and tightly interwoven parties and party clusters. Figures 6 and Figure 7 reveal 
the same striking structural change, initiated immediately after the electoral reform of 1993, 
and firmly in place by 1996.   
The most striking feature of the post-reform structure is the absence of structure. Here we 
observe a giant jumble of overlapping parties: secular and lay, separatist and nationalist, right 
and left. One can move, for example, from the far right (Movimento Sociale Italiano) to the 
far left (Rifondazione Comunista) in fewer than three steps, often in only two and in some 
instances through a direct tie.  
Against this background, it is useful to recall the expected outcomes of election reform. On 
one had, reform was designed to lead to a reduction in the number of political parties.  It was 
also designed to clarify the ideational space of politics, by encouraging the formation of large 
political parties or party coalitions whose platforms encompassed diverse positions on issues 
arising civil society. Clarification of the political sphere was expected to lead to increased 
transparency—that is a tighter linkage between constituents with interests and the officials 
who represented them. Neither of these outcomes occurred. Instead, election reform led to 
the perverse and wholly unanticipated amplification of the perversities of both pure 
proportional representation and majoritarian systems. Specifically, we observe an explosion, 
rather than reduction, in the number of parties, massive coalition formation without 
ideological foundation, and a crowding of the center. This pattern is robust and observed for 
all levels, at roughly the same time.   
 
Deep Structure 
It is possible that because we pool alliances across multiple municipalities into a single graph 
that the core finding we report – especially for the data arising from the thousands of small 
municipalities across the whole of Italy—is artifactual. To address this possibility we consider 
whether or not electoral reform impacted alliance formation evenly across each region. 
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Figure 8 reports as a box plot, the proportion of parties in the largest component over time, 
for each region.  
 
Figure 8: The proportion of parties in the largest component by region.  
 
Thus, 50% of the observations for each region are found within the box, the solid line marks 
the median, and outliers are indicated by dots. Prior to electoral reform in 1993, far fewer 
than 20%—and more typically fewer than 10%—of parties were in the largest component. 
In fact, we observe pre-election alliances only in the North—Lombardia, Veneto, and 
Piemonte—where separatist regional parties joined together to compose what would later 
emerge as the Northern League. After 1996, more than half of all parties, and frequently 
more, are located in a giant central component. It follows that pooling observations across 
small disconnected municipalities from different regions is not inducing the macro-structure 
we observe.  
It is possible that the variation we do observe in Figure 8 reflects long-standing regional 
differences in Italy that are often thought to be associated with different political cultures, 
arising in part from different underlying social structures. In the industrial north and center,  
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politics is thought to be more clearly aligned with class cleavages, whereas in the agrarian 
south, clientalism remains a powerful force (Putnam 1993; Riley 2005; Santoro 1997). To 
test this hypothesis, we consider the structure of alliances in one Northern region where we 
observe pre-election alliances (Lombardia) and one Southern region (Campania). While no 
direct comparison captures all of the meaningful dimensions, by analogy to the United 
States, this would be akin to comparing Illinois (industrial) and Louisiana (agrarian and with 
a long tradition of corruption). Under PR, the left (PSI) dominated local politics in 
Lombardia, whereas in Campania—and most forcefully in Naples—the DC was hegemonic.  
For both Figure 9 (the structure of alliances in Lombardia) and Figure 10 (the structure of 
alliances in Campania) we report the historical pattern of party alliances for the pre and post-
reform period.  As before, reading down the columns from left to right, one can see for both 
regions a strikingly similar pattern. By 1996 in Lombardia and 1995 in Campania, the 
majority of all political parties become interlinked within a single giant component which 
progressively increases in both size and density over time. This occurs despite quite striking 
differences in political culture (Gobetti 1996; Hazelrigg 1970; Misra and Hicks 1994; 
Weakliem 1991; Seton-Watson 1967). 
 
Figure 11: Newman-Girwan modularity score by region over time 
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Structural isomorphism is thus not artifactual—rather it is the result of the logic of politics. 
The electoral reform of 1993 impacted each region in the same way, instituting new rules 
that provided the context for similar strategic responses on the part of parties.  
It is possible, of course, that Lombardia and Campania—both dominated by the politics of 
an important city (Milan and Naples, respectively) could exhibit similar pattern as a 
consequence of this underlying similarity. To assess this possibility, and to provide 
confidence that the cases were not selected because they fit the theory proposed herein, we 
calculate Newman-Girvan modularity scores for each region over time, from 1997 to 2001, 
that is for the five years where we observe the vast majority of parties in a single, fully 
connected component (Girvan and Newman 2002). The Newman-Girvan algorithm seeks 
to identify natural breaks in graphs to reveal “communities” of nodes, or more precisely, 
densely connected subgroups. The algorithm iteratively removes edges with high between-
ness and seeks to identify the most parsimonious partition of nodes to induce disjoint sub-
components. The quality of the partition is reported by the modularity score. In general, 
modularity scores for social networks appear in the .4 to .7 range. Scores lower than .4 
indicate that it is not possible to achieve a meaningful partition; that the graph under 
consideration is substantively an integrated component (Newman and Girvan 2004) Figure 
11, reports results from this analysis. Two facts are revealed. First, Lombardia (indexed by a 
star) and Campania (indexed by a circle) are typical regions; structures we observe there are 
observed in each of the other regions.  Second, only in a few instances are modularity scores 
(Q) reported in acceptable ranges.  From 1997 to 2001, a meaningful partition of the 
political alliance structure is impossible.  
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| 5 | DISCUSSION 
 
n Italy, from 1948 to 1992, governments were formed and collapsed with astonishing 
frequency—lasting on average less than one year. Despite this, or more accurately, 
because of this, the Christian Democratic (DC) party was able to maintain control of the 
polity without interruption. Material rather than ideational interests determined political 
outcomes. Likewise, mystery and intrigue rather than clarity and transparency characterized 
the political process. One indicator of an absence of accountability is corruption.  From 
1948 to 1992, for example, just considering the lower house the judiciary charged 1588 of 
the 2923 (or 54%) of the members of parliament with some crime. Considering only serious 
crimes (including murder), the judiciary brought charges against 1192 individuals, or 41% 
of those who ever served. With the exception of elections in 1976 and 1992, those charged 
with corruption were as likely or more likely (from 1948 to 1956) to be re-elected as those 
not charged (Chang and Golden 2006).  Perhaps most significantly, from 1972 to 1992, the 
vast majority of deputies charged with serious corruption served in the ruling coalition.  
It is possible that Italian voters like corrupt officials and set out to elect them. This is not the 
case.  Italian voters dislike crooks at the same modest rate that other voters dislike crooks. In 
the United States, for example, officials convicted of corruption lose somewhere between 6 
and 11% of their support. In Japan, 62% of officials convicted of corruption are reelected, 
compared to 51% of Italian deputies (Chang and Gooden 2006). Despite similarly modest 
penalties, the proportion of corrupt officials in Japan and the United States never approaches 
50%. Thus the rate of corruption cannot be tied to greater indifference on the part of Italian 
voters.  It was, and is, the product of a structure of rule that rewards clientalism.  
This insight was the insight of the Italian reformers who called for electoral reform.  Noting 
that a specific structure of rule—a structure best characterized as an intertwined clique of 
parties strung together on the basis of post-election instrumental deal making in order to 
retain power—was associated with corruption, electoral reformers set out to transform the 
rules of engagement to break that structure. Electoral reform was thus designed to open the 
system to a politics based on ideal rather than material interests. In this article we show that 
electoral reform produced outcomes wildly unanticipated by reformers and theorists. Instead 
of a diminution in the number of political parties we observe an explosion; instead of clear 
factions we observe the formation of a giant, knotty, cyclic, and intertwined cluster of parties 
formed on the basis of local and ideologically contradictory, pre-election alliances.  
The central empirical finding of this paper is, of course, that the mixed electoral system in 
the Italian case amplified the perversities of both the proportional representation and 
majoritarian systems. Parties and party fragments split apart; new parties were formed, and 
all raced to form alliances with other parties in order to exploit small incentives in the 
electoral system. These incentives rewarded small parties in fragile coalitions with small 
majorities. Rational parties thus were thus encouraged to make irrational deals in advance of 
each election. These deals, when aggregated, reveal a system in which communists are as 
close to post-fascists as they are to separatist, where separatists are as close to religious 
conservatives as they are to nationalists, and where nationalists are as close to the corrupt 
remains of the Christian Democrats as they are to the socialists. This is why many observers 
feel that the more things change, the more they stay the same. 
I 
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As political sociologists, we are concerned with opinions and interests, parties and politics, 
institutions and outcomes. In this article, we suggest that an old concern of political 
sociology, electoral regimes, not be forgotten in the mix of important factors that structure 
the political experiences of countries, individuals and their representatives (Linz and Stepan 
1996). For the structure of electoral systems, as suggested by the Italian case, can in often 
quite profound ways change the rules of engagement in politics, and thus transform the 
possibilities for democratic renewal, the fair representation of interests, and the sweeping 
away of corruption, that provide a rationale for our concern with how those who rule, really 
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